Abstract-Decentralized and P2P (peer-to-peer) VPNs (virtual private networks) have recently become quite popular for con necting users in small to medium collaborative environments, such as academia, businesses, and homes. In the realm of VPNs, there exist centralized, decentralized, and P2P solutions. Central ized systems require a single entity to provide and manage VPN server(s); decentralized approaches allow more than one entity to share the management responsibility for the VPN infrastructure, while existing P2P approaches rely on a centralized infrastructure but allow users to bypass it to form direct low-latency, high throughput links between peers. In this paper, we describe a novel VPN architecture that can claim to be both decentralized and P2P, using methods that lower the entry barrier for V�N deployment compared to other VPN approaches. Our solution extends existing work on IP-over-P2P (IPOP) overlay networks to address challenges of configuration, management, bootstrapping, and security. We present the first implementation and analysis of a P2P system secured by DTLS (datagram transport layer security) along with decentralized techniques for revoking user access.
I. INTRODUCTION
limit the scope of Archer and require dedicated administra tion, whereas existing decentralized solutions require manual configuration of links between peers, which is beyond the scope of Archer's target users. Current P2P virtual network (VN) approaches either lack scalability or proper security components to be considered VPNs.
We began our original foray into user-friendly VN ap proaches with IPOP [2] . Previous work on IPOP focused on the routing mechanisms and address allocation with multi ple virtual networks (VNs) sharing a single P2P overlay. A shared overlay has significant drawbacks as misconfigured or malicious peers could potentially disable the entire overlay, rendering all VNs useless. Though if security and hence isolation is important, prior to VN deployment, all nodes would need to be configured with a security stack than the P2P infrastructure prior to deploying the VN system in order to create a VPN, given the complexity many users would probably reconsider the P2P approache and use a simple centralized VPN.
To address this challenge, or to make a fully decentralized P2P VPN, in this paper, we extend the IPOP concept to support bootstrapping from public infrastructures and overlays into pri vate and secure P2P overlays whose membership is limited to an individual VPN user base. Our work is based upon Castro et al. [3] , suggesting that a single overlay can be used to bootstrap service overlays. We present a practical implementation and evaluation of this concept. We then consider security in the overlay and present the first implementation and evaluation of an overlay with secure communiation both between end points in the P2P overlay (e.g. VPN nodes) as well as between nodes connected by overlay edges. Security requires a means for peer revocation; however, current revocation techniques rely on centralized systems such as certificate revocation lists (CRLs). Our proposed approach allows revocation using scalable techniques provided by the P2P overlay itself. We call the completed system and the interface used to administrate it GroupVPN, a novel decentralized P2P VPN.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. IPOP along P2P overlays are introduced in Section II. Throughout the paper, there are two techniques used to evaluate our ap proaches, simulation and real system deployments, these are described in Section III. Section IV describes our techniques that allow users to create their own private overlays from a shared public overlay in spit of NATs. Use of security protocols has been assumed in many P2P works though without consideration of implementation and overheads, we investigate implementation issues and overheads of security in P2P with emphasis on P2P VPNs in Section V. Without revocation, use of security is limited, in decentralized systems, use of centralized revocation methods do not work, we present novel mechanisms for decentralized revocation in Section VI.
The complete system, GroupVPN, is presented in Section VII.
Section VIII compares and contrasts our work with related work. Section IX concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
This section describes the core organization of IPOP, a struc tured P2P virtual network, including background on structured overlays, address allocation and discovery, and connectivity.
A. P2P Overlays
The type of P2P overlay chosen for a VPN has an effect on how easy the VPN is to program, deploy, and secure, on its efficiency, and on its scalability. The two primary infrastructures for P2P overlays are unstructured and structured systems. Unstructured systems use mechanisms such as global knowledge, broadcasts, or stochastic techniques [4] to search the overlay. As the system grows, maintaining and searching typically does not scale. Alternatively, structured approaches provide guaranteed search times typically with a lower bound of O(log N), where N is the size of the network. In terms of complexity, for small systems, unstructured systems may be easier to implement, but as the system grows it may become inefficient.
IPOP uses a structured P2P framework named Brunet [5] , which is based upon Symphony [6] , a one-dimensional ring with a harmonic distribution of shortcuts to far nodes. Struc tured systems are able to provide bounds on routing and lookup operations by self-organizing into well-defined topolo gies, such as a one-dimensional ring or a hypercube. Links in the overlay can be made to guarantee efficient lookup and/or routing times (e.g. Brunet automatically creates links between peers that communicate often to achieve efficiency in IP -over
P2P communication).
A key component of most structured overlays is support for decentralized storagelretrieval of information such as a distributed hash table (DHT). The DHT builds upon the existence of a P2P address space. All peers in a structured system have a unique, uniformly distributed P2P address. A DHT maps look up values or keys (usually by a hashing function) into the P2P address space. While there are various forms of fault tolerance, a minimalist DHT stores values at the node whose address is closest to the value's key. DHTs can be used to coordinate organization and discovery of resources, making them attractive for self-configuration and organization in decentralized collaborative environments. As explained in the next section, IPOP, uses a DHT to coordinate decentralized organization.
B. Connecting to the VPN
To connect to IPOP, a peer needs only to connect to an existing Brunet infrastructure. Many IPOP systems can coexist sharing a single overlay. The motivation for doing so is that bootstrapping a P2P system can be challenging, requiring users to have access to public IP addressable nodes or being able to configure a router or firewall to enable inbound connections.
A peer connected to IPOP's P2P infrastructure can take advantage of its support for NAT traversal through hole punch ing [7] . When performing hole punching, peers first obtain mappings of their private IP address and port to their public IP address and port and then exchange them over a shared medium, in this case the P2P overlay. The peers attempt to si multaneously form connections with each other, tricking NATs and firewalls into allowing inbound connections, because the NAT believed an outbound flow already exists, thus allowing two machines behind two different NATs direct connectivity.
In case peers cannot establish direct connectivity, messages can be relayed through the P2P overlay to each other albeit with added latency and reduced throughput.
This approach enables peers behind NATs and firewalls to seamlessly connect to each other, without requiring peers to host their own bootstrap servers. The requirements for a a bootstrap server include a public IP and the ability to exchange that with users of the system. Though the system should be redundant because if a server in a single bootstrap server system goes offline new nodes will be unable to join the overlay.
C. Network Corifiguration
In the context of VPNs, structured overlays can handle organization of the network space, address allocation and discovery, decentrally through the use of a DHT. Approaches along these lines have been proposed in [8] , [9] . Membership in the VPN includes a matching membership in the structured overlay, thus all VPN peers have a P2P address. To address the challenges of having mUltiple VPNs in the same over lay, each IPOP group has its own namespace, reducing the likelihood of overlap. To enable scalable and decentralized address allocation and discovery, peers store mappings of IP address to P2P address into the DHT, typically of the form hash(namespace + IP) = P2Paddress. Thus a peer attempting to allocate an address will insert this (key, value) pair into the overlay. The first peer to do this will be the owner of the IP address allocation. Therefore the DHT must support atomic writes.
Mechanisms to self-configure the IP address and network parameters of the local system can be provided by DHCP (de centralized host configuration protocol), manually configuring the IP address, or the VPN hooking into O/S AP Is. Address discovery is initiated when an outgoing packet for a remote peer arrives at the VPN software. At which point, the VPN will query the DHT with the IP address to obtain the owner's P2P address and forward the packet to the destination. Discussion on both these topics is covered in more depth in our previous work [10] .
III. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
Throughout this paper, our quantitative evaluation environ ment uses both real deployments on P lanetLab and simulation.
The evaluation requirements dictate the environment used.
When the perspective of a single node is useful, P lanetLab provides good results, though when attempting to measure all resources to have Brunet installed and connect to the relay messages, and obtain their public address mapping overlay and then much more time to observe certain behavas described in [12] . Examples of other potential bootstrap iors, making regression and verification tests complicated. To overlays include popular and well established P2P systems, address this, we have extended Brunet to support a simusuch as Gnutella, Skype, and Kademlia. Our initial work lation mode. The simulator inherits all of the Brunet P2P supports bootstrapping from XMPP (Jabber) systems and our overlay logic but uses simulated virtual time based upon own P2P overlay, Brunet. In this paper, we focus on user an event-driven scheduler instead of real time. Furthermore, perceptions of these technologies with emphasis on bootstrap the simulation framework uses a specialized transport layer times and performance overheads, unlike our previous work, to avoid the overhead of using TCP or UDP on the host which verified its utility for bootstrapping private overlays.
system, both of which are limited resources and can hamper To bootstrap from an existing Brunet overlay, peers first in the ability to simulate large systems. The specialized transport sert their public overlay node address into the key represented uses datagrams to pass messages between nodes, thus from by hash($PrivateOverlayN amespace) and continue to do the node's perspective, it is very similar to a UDP transport so regularly until they disconnect, so as to not let the entry and can simulate both latency and packet dropping. Latency become stale and disappear. Peers attempting to bootstrap into between all node pairs is set to 100 ms. the private overlay can then query this key and obtain a list Both simulation and real system evaluation provide unique of public overlay nodes that are currently acting as proxies advantages. Simulations allow faster than real time execution into the private overlay. By using the public overlay as a of reasonable sized networks (up to a few thousand) using a transport, similar to UDP or TCP, the private overlay node single resource, while enabling easy debugging. In contrast, forms bootstrapping connections via the public overlay. At deployment on real systems, in particular PlanetLab, presents which point, overlay bootstrapping proceeds as normal. The opportunities to add non-deterministic, dynamic behavior into entire process is represented in Figure 1 .
the system which can be difficult to replicate, such as network In a small private overlay, there is a possibility that none glitches and long CPU delays on processing. of the members have a public address, making it difficult to
IV. TOWARDS PRIVATE OVERLAYS
Many users of IPOP begin by using our shared overlay and, 
A. Time to Bootstrap a Private Overlay
This experiment focuses on the overheads in bootstrapping a private overlay using our techniques mentioned in the previous section. The time to bootstrap can be derived analytically by considering the minimum steps for a node to join the public overlay, obtain private overlay peers from the public overlay DHT, and then connect to the private overlay. In Brunet, peers begin by forming leaf or bootstrapping connections and use these to communicate with the neighbor or peer in the P2P network nearest to their P2P address. The process to form a connection can be done in as few as 4 messages and up to 6, if the peers only know each other's P2P address, which is the case for neighbor connections.
Assuming a peer already has IP address information for another, a connection can be initiated by the peer sending a message to the remote peer expressing the desire for a connection. The remote node responds by either rejecting the request or committing to the connection. In the next exchange, the initiating peer commits to forming the connection and the remote peer acknowledges. The two phase commit process is used to handle the complexity that ensues when multiple simultaneous connection attempts occur in parallel. All these messages take 1 hop, since they are direct links between peers.
When peers only have each other's P2P address and/or the initiating peer is behind a NAT, it may take fifth and sometimes a sixth message. These messages are requests for the remote peer's IP addresses as well as asking the peer to connect with the initiating peer, addressing the case where the remote peer is behind a NAT and cannot handle inbound messages. These messages are routed over the overlay taking 10g(N) hops, where N is the network size of the public overlay.
Private overlay bootstrapping follows a similar process, though, first, the peer acquires P2P addresses of other partici pants through the public DHT, an operation taking 2 * log(N)
hops. In the private overlay, the leaf connections do not communicate directly; rather, they use the public overlay, causing some of the 1 hop operations above to take 10g(N)
hops. Finally, the finding the nearest remote peer in the private overlay takes 10g(N) + log(n), where n is the network size of the private overlay.
Given this model, each operation takes the following hop counts: public overlay bootstrapping = > 8 + 10g(N), DHT operations = > 2 * 10g(N), and private overlay bootstrapping
The cumulative operation takes 12 + 8 * log(N) + log(n) hops. The dominating overhead in bootstrapping the private overlay is the time it takes to perform overlay operations on the public overlay (log(N)).
For instance, assuming a network size of 512 public and 8
private, a node should be connected within 87 hops.
To evaluate our implementation for GroupVPN, we use both PlanetLab and the simulator. lOO tests were run for various network sizes. Though due to difficulty in controlling network sizes in PlanetLab, we set each PlanetLab node to randomly decide if it would connect to the private overlay. The network sizes were then used in the simulator and the analytical model.
The average public network size for each of these tests was 600. Our results are presented in Figure 2 2. CDF of the time to bootstrap a private overlay node in a private overlay of the size stated in the legend using a public overlay consisting of 600 nodes. Using a 100 ms delay like the simulator results in 9.2 and 9.3 seconds for the analytical model for private network sizes of 68 and 147, respectively.
Based upon the results presented in Figure 2 , the boot strapping time for the implementation performs better than the analytical model, due to the simplicity of the analytical model and the small network sizes. It is of interest that while the simulator results tend to be in a well defined range, the PlanetLab results have a few outliers with long bootstrap times. Some of the expected causes for this are churn in the system and state machine timeouts in Brunet, though we have not considered this in this in much depth in this work.
B. Overhead of Pathing
Much like the previous experiment, this verifies that the pathing technique has negligible overheads for VPN usage. IPsec are not convenient due to complexity, i.e., operating system specific, portability constraints, and lack of common APIs. Security protocols that rely on reliable connections, such as SSL or TLS are undesirable as well as they would require a userpace implementation of reliable streams (akin to TCP). As such, we have implemented an abstraction akin to a security filter as presented in Figure 3 , which enables nearly transparent use of security libraries and protocols. To this date, we have implemented both a DTLS [13] Certificate embed identity of the owner, thus a signed cer tificate states that the signer trusts that the identity is accurate.
In network systems, the certificate uses the domain name to uniquely identify and limit the use of a certificate. When a CA signs the certificate, by including the domain name, it ensures that users can trust that a certificate is valid, while used to secure traffic to that domain. Communication with another domain using the same certificate will raise a flag and will result in the user not trusting the certificate. In environments with NATs, dynamic IP addresses, or portable devices, typical of P2P systems, assigning a certificate to a domain name will be a hassle as it constrains mobility and the type of 
B. Overheads of Overlay Security
When applying an additional layer to a P2P system, there are overheads in terms of time to connect with the overlay.
Other less obvious effects will be throughput, latency, and processing overheads, assuming that the P2P system will be used over a wide area network, where the latency and through put limitations between two points will make the overhead of security negligible. Though bootstrapping will be affected due to additional round trip messages used for forming secure connections. 
. DTLS handshake
The DTLS handshake as presented in Figure 4 , which consists of 6 messages or 3 round trips. PtP security may very well have an effect on the duration of overlay bootstrapping.
There even exists a possibility that with more messages during bootstrap, the probability one drops is higher, which could, in turn, also have an effect, though possibly negligible, on time to connect. To evaluate these concerns, we have employed both simulation and real system experiments.
The following experiments use both simulation and Plan etLab deployment to evaluate time to connect a new node to an existing resource. Then another experiment is performed to evaluate how long it takes to bootstrap various sized overlays if all nodes join at the same time. This experiment is only feasible via simulation as attempting to reproduce in a real system is extremely difficult due to how quickly the operations complete.
1) Adding a Single Node: This experiment determines how
long it takes a single node to join an existing overlay with and without DTLS security. The experiment is performed using both simulation and PlanetLab. After deploying a set of nodes without security and with security on PlanetLab, the network is crawled to determine the size of the network. In both cases, the overlay maintained an average size of around 600 nodes.
At which point, we connected a node 1,000, each time using a new, randomly generated P2P address, thus connecting to a different point in the overlay. The experiment concludes as soon as the node has connected to the peers in the P2P overlay immediately before and after it in the P2P address space.
In the simulation, a new overlay is created and afterward a new node joins, this is repeated 100 times. The cumulative distribution functions obtained from the different experiments are presented in Figure 5 . The problem with the DHT approach is that it does not provide an event notification for members currently commu nicating with the peer. While peers could continue to poll the DHT to determine a revocation, doing so is inefficient.
Furthermore, a malicious peer, who has a valid but revoked certificate could force every member in the overlay to query the DHT, negatively affecting the DHT nodes storing the revocation.
B. Broadcast Revocation
Broadcast revocation can be used to address the deficiencies of DHT revocation. As a topic of previous research works [14] , [15] , structured overlays can be used without additional state to perform efficient broadcasts from any point in the overlay to the entire overlay. The form of broadcast can be used to perform to notify the entire overlay immediately about a new revocation. In these papers, analysis and simulations have
shown that the approach can be completed in 0(1og2 n ) time. Our modified algorithm as illustrated in Figure 7 utilizes the organization of a structured system with a circular address space that requires peers be connected to those whose node addresses are the closest to their own, features typical of one-dimensional structured overlays including Chord [16] , Pastry [17] , and Symphony. Using such an organization, it is possible to do perform a broadcast with no additional state.
To perform a broadcast, each node performs the following recursive algorithm:
BROADCAST(start, end, message):
for i in length( connections) do In this algorithm, the broadcast initiator uses its own address as the start and end, thus the broadcast will span the entire overlay after completing recursive calls at each connected node. A recursive end, "n_end", must be inside the region between "start" and "end", thus if the connection following the current sending connection, "connections[i + 1]", is not in that region, it will only broadcast up to "end" and not the address specified by that connection. Finally, nodes, who have a connection to the malicious peer, will end the connection prior to accidentally forwarding the message to the peer by receiving and acting upon the revocation prior to forwarding the message. To summarize, the overlay is recursively parti tioned amongst the nodes at each hop in the broadcast. By doing so, all nodes receive the broadcast without receiving duplicate broadcast messages.
C. Evaluation of Broadcast
We performed an evaluation on the broadcast using the simulation to determine how quickly peers in the overlay would receive the message. The tested network sizes ranged from 2 to 256 in powers of 2. The tests were evaluations were performed 100 times for each network size. The CDF of hops for each node are presented in Figure 8 . The results make it quite clear that the broadcast can efficiently distribute a revocation much more quickly than 10g(N) time. A key assumption in using these is that a Sybil [18] , or collusion attack, is difficult in the secured overlay. If a Sybil attack is successful, both a DHT and broadcast revocation may be unsuccessful, though peers could fix this problem by obtaining the CRL out of band. In addition, previous work [19] has described decentralized techniques to limit the probability of such attacks from occurring. In our approach, the use of central authority to review certificate requests can be used to limit a single user from obtaining too many certificates as well as ensuring uniform distribution of that user's P2P addresses, further hampering the likelihood of a Sybil attack. The ability to automate this is left as future work.
One way to mitigate sybil attacks using the broadcast ap proach is to bundle colluding offenders into a single revocation share a single site, so long as the group members trust the site for improved latency and throughput reasons, thus members to host the CA private key. acting as routes in the overlay incur the price of acting as VIII. RELATED WORK
A. VPNs
Hamachi [20] is a centralized P2P VPN provider using the web site for authentication, peer discovery, and connection establishment. While the Hamachi protocol claims to support various types of security [21] , the implementation appears to only support the key distribution center (KDC) requiring that all peers establish trusted relationship through the central website. The Hamachi approach makes it easy for users to deploy their own services, but places limitations on network size, uses a proprietary security stack, and does not allow independent VPN deployments. In contrast, our approach presents a completely decoupled environment allowing peers to start using our shared system to bootstrap private overlays and migrate away without cost if need be. Furthermore our approach relies only on a central server to obtain the certificate otherwise, it is decentralized. In Hamachi, if the central server goes offline, no new peers can join the VPN.
Campagnol VPN [22] provides similar features to Hamachi: a P2P VPN that relies on a central server for rendezvous or discovery of peers. The key differences between Hamachi and Campagnol is that Campagnol is free and does not provide a service; users msut deploy their own rendezvous service.
The authors of Campagnol also state that the current approach limits the total number of peers sharing a VPN to 100 so not to overload the rendezvous service. The current implementation does not support a set of rendezvous nodes, though doing so would make the approach much more like ours. In addition, the system relies on traditional distribution of a CRL to handle revocation. 
IX. CONCLUSIONS
This paper overviews the architecture implementation of GroupVPN, a system that is the first to demonstrate the practical feasibility of using structured overlays as a basis for easy-to-use, group-oriented, P2P VPNs. Explicitly, we have taken common structured overlays and explored orga nization, public overlays for connectivity, and private over lays for security and then described our GroupVPN which binds them the components together to create collaborative environments for configuration and management of VPNs.
This paper extends upon the IPOP virtual network to support user-friendly approaches for users to create and manage their own virtual private networks. To accomplish this, each IPOP system bootstraps into its own unique, secure P2P overlay.
This approach not only enables secure communications in 
